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       Pakistan is currently faced with virulent socio-religious polarization that ultimately 
manifests itself across the political spectrum. The 'radical' right-wing religious forces are 
vehemently competing with so called 'liberal' elements for decisive representation.1 
These two contested positions do not seem to reflect the aspirations of the majority of 
ordinary people of Pakistan, who do not support religious fundamentalism or espouse 
overly secular, liberal values but have not found a 'definitive voice' or a 'representative 
space' in the political or public sphere.2  
 
       In this context it is particularly interesting to study the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf 
(PTI), one of the 'emerging' political parties in Pakistan which reflects such mainstream 
concerns. Significantly a prominent feature on it's agenda is the aim to 'bridge the 
polarized divide' in the Pakistani society.3 The PTI describes itself as a Centrist party 
with no professed affiliations with the religious right-wing or the liberal groups in 
Pakistan. At times the PTI agenda overlaps with one group or the other, but since it does 
not wholly endorse the positions of either camps it is looked down upon by both the 
liberal elite and the right-wing groups. This is a dilemma that the PTI faces when it seeks 
representation in the public sphere, which is dominated by these two factions.  
  
     This paper seeks to study the PTI's current place in the religiously polarized sphere of 
Pakistan politics and how it navigates it's way through the current political scene. It will 
also take into view how both the liberal and the religious right-wing camps and the 
society perceive PTI. It also aims to explore how the PTI intends to address and rectify 
the dilemma of growing polarization in the Pakistani society. The PTI describes itself as 
a 'broad based socio-political movement', therefore this paper aims to study it as such. It 
will also discuss the PTI's particular vision for the place of religion in Pakistan politics 
and analyze to what extent their agenda resonates with the goals and expectations of the 
general public. It tries to identify the disadvantages and constraints PTI faces in order to 
create space for it's Centrist agenda in the national discourse. It also studies how this 
                                                 
1 Ejaz Haider. 'Where is the Centre?'. Basil Nabi Malik. 'Will the Moderates Ever Stand Up?', ET 
2 Eqbal Ahmed in Making Enemies.1997 also  Interview with Dr. Riffat Hassan. Newsline.2004 
3 Interviews with Imran Khan.  Chairman Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf,  also the  PTI Constitution. 
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agenda differs from other Centrist parties. Ultimately the paper tries to assess whether 
the new 'emerging centers of influence' in Pakistan will allow Centrist aspirations, such 
as those of PTI, to be articulated in the polarized scenario. 
 
A Brief Background on Pakistan Tehreek-i -Insaaf: 
 
      The PTI is described as an 'upcoming' but 'untested' political party, which has not 
found success in electoral representation in the country as yet. Infact it has yet to move 
beyond what may be called a 'pressure group status' in the political system.4 PTI 
describes itself as not merely being a political party but a 'broad based social movement' 
that 'embraces the interests of all Pakistanis'.5 The PTI was formed in 1996 as 'a 
movement for justice', aimed against the 'corrupt ruling elite' on the initiative of Imran 
Khan, a former cricketer and one of the leading philanthropists in Pakistan.6 PTI 
contested its first elections in 1997, failing to win any seats and then again in 2002 with 
the party winning 0.8% of the popular vote with 1 out of 272 seats in the Parliament. It 
did not participate in the Feb, 2008 elections which it cited as being 'illegitimate'. It has 
participated fully as a party in one election yet, so it believes that it has not had the 
opportunity to test it's mettle in the realm of political representation. There is some 
evidence of increasing  public support for the party as the PTI has came out in second 
place in many by-polls in different locations recently.7 
 
     The party comprises of a diverse membership, with members from different ethnic 
groups, social classes, minority sects holding prominent leadership positions. Presently 
the PTI maintains chapters in all five provinces of Pakistan with a large part of it's 
membership coming from the urban areas. The PTI's Women's Wing and the Insaaf 
Student's Federation, which is the official student wing of PTI, are among the 
predominantly active organs of the PTI. The party condemns 'power politics' and 
                                                 
4,  PTI official website. www.insaf.org.pk, News Night with Syed Talat Hussain. April, 2011 
5  PTI Ideology, www.insaf.org. 
6 The Imran Khan Foundation. http://imrankhanfoundation.org 
7  PTI official website. www.insaf.org.pk 
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describes it's primary objective as being the 'initiation of reform' in the existing system, 
rather than 'coming into power'. 8 
 
      The party's slogan 'Insaaf, Insaniat, Khuddari', or 'Justice, Humanity and Self-Esteem' 
encapsulates it's philosophy of seeing Pakistan as a 'an egalitarian modern Islamic 
welfare state' and a 'genuine democracy with a rule of law, an independent judiciary 
and economic system' which upholds the fundamental rights of 'all citizens regardless of 
caste, creed and religion'. The PTI believes in 'Islamic socialism' and harbors a vision of 
'a shared ethos' which can bring together its diverse social classes, linguistic, regional 
and religious groups. The PTI describes itself as committed to 'political stability' through 
'credible democracy, transparency in government and accountability of leadership'. 
According to the PTI, 'the concentration of power in the hand of a corrupt ruling elite 
has disrupted the spirit of federalism causing a sense of deprivation amongst the 
federating units which has resulted, in narrow parochialism, ethnicity and division 
among the people which  threatens 'the integrity and solidarity of Pakistan'.9 
 
The Issue of Polarization and PTI's vision of Islam in Pakistan. 
 
     An overview of recent events reveals a 'divided' and 'deeply confused' sociopolitical 
milieu of today's Pakistan.10 The political discourse in Pakistan seems bitterly divided 
along numerous, cross-cutting cleavages in which religion has again and again proven 
to be the primary fault line. Islam has clearly played a decisive role in defining the 
political trajectory of  the country.11 
     However it was a correlation between religious and political factors that fused to 
create the current state of affairs in Pakistan. In many ways the origins of this current 
schism can be traced back to the 1958–1969 period when the advent of modernization, 
combined with the secularization of society, divided Pakistani society into 'a secular, 
                                                 
8 Interviews with Imran Khan. 
9 PTI Manifesto AP Report, http://tribune.com.pk//imran-khan-vows-to make Pakistan-a-welfare-state 
10 Ejaz Haider. 'Where is the Centre?'. Express Tribune. also Faisal Siddiqi. The Great Divide.  Dawn  
11 Mohammad Waseem. Politics and the State in Pakistan. 1998. and Shirin Sadeghi. Huffington Post.  
 
 5
Westernized ruling class and the mass of people living according to time-honored Indo-
Islamic traditions'. Each group adhered to it's own cultural, social, and political outlook, 
which resulted in alienation between the rulers and the masses.12 Some aspects of this 
polarization can be explained in the context of the 'High Islam' vs. 'Low Islam' debate, 
where 'Low Islam' is associated with the masses and the rule oriented 'High Islam' has 
always been associated with the religious orthodoxy and the urban ruling elite. In 
Pakistan's case, as is the case in all post-colonial Muslim states, most social and political 
institutions that sustained the traditional Islamic life in the past have disintegrated and 
the institutional make up of the contemporary urban institutions and the Muslim 
bourgeoisie bears 'an imprint of considerable secularization'. The secular elite continued 
to use 'High Islam' to validate themselves and elevated the puritanical clergy to a 
superficial, symbolic prominence. 13  
     While the 'secular elite' were supported surreptitiously by the West, the religious 
right elements were cultivated and consolidated by ardent Saudi backing to counter the 
increasing secular influence.14 Ironically though both factions have exploited each other 
for dubious gains, the rivalry between the two has culminated in the present scenario of 
political polarization.  Many experts believe that if the current polarized tension and the  
'climate of social insecurity' continues to exist it will eventually 'culminate in revolution' 
and the 'collapse of the social order' in Pakistan.15  
 
     To add to this conflict in the wake of the 'war on terror', the current thrust of this 
polarization has become such that one can either be considered to be pro-Islam and anti-
America (liberal) or pro-America and anti-Islam (right-wing). Being 'liberal' indicates in 
general terms that 'one has pro-Western tendencies and finds any mention of Islam 
abhorrent' while being a religious conservative means one is aggressively 'anti-Western 
and a follower of some puritan interpretation of Islam'. 16 The 'liberals' stand up for 
'everything except Pakistan', while the 'radical Right-wing' wants to 'fight an 
                                                 
12  Vali Nasr. The Vanguard of the Islamic revolution :the Jamaʻat-i Islami of Pakistan. University of California Press. 
13  Nasim A. Jawed. Islam's Political Culture. UTP.1999. also  Interview with Dr. Mohammad Waseem. 
14  Zia Mian and Iftikhar Ahmad. Making Enemies, Creating Conflict: Pakistan's Crises of State Society.  
15 Eqbal Ahmed in Making Enemies .&  Rasul Bux Rais, 'The Pakistani Spirit'. Express Tribune. 
16 News Night with Talat Hussain,  also  Basil Nabi Malik. 'Will the Moderates Ever Stand Up?', ET 
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Armageddon and have Pakistan become 'an isolated, pariah state'.17 To add to this any 
dissent to both of these camps is admonished decisively and instantly labeled as 'un-
Islamic' by the right wing and considered 'pro-jihadist' by the liberals.  
     The PTI does not believe in such 'simplistic binary characterizations' and wants to 
overcome them. One of the central aspects of the PTI's agenda is that it wants to create 'a 
middle ground which provides a breathing space for ordinary people' and does not 
demand an affiliation with any camps. In many ways the PTI considers both the 'liberals' 
and the radical religious groups to be 'appropriating Islam for their own benefits and 
purposes'. The 'liberals' look down on Islam and use the argument that the Islamic 
fundamentalism is spreading across Pakistan to present the specter of 'Talibanization of 
Pakistan' to banish Islam from the public discourse, while the fundamentalists, use 
religious dogma for political purposes to undercut rivals and demand unwilling 
submission from the public.18 The PTI believes that while 'Islam remains the bedrock of 
Pakistan's foundations', religion should not be used to 'whip up passions to create fear in 
society'. 19 
     This unusual vantage point in the polarized debate is reflected manifestly in PTI's 
political outlook. For instance earlier in 2006 the PTI rejected both the Protection of 
Women’s Rights Bill which was championed by the liberal sections of the society and the 
Hasba Bill that was enforced by the right wing factions. The PTI declared both the bills to 
have been adopted with 'ulterior motives'- the former to divide opposition parties the 
latter to establish a parallel judicial system.20 By it's rejection of the Women's Protection 
Bill along with the religious groups, the PTI was labeled as being 'anti-women's rights 
with pro-Taliban views'.21 At the same time the PTI invoked the ire of right-wing groups 
when it condemned their actions in the NWFP and described the Hasba Bill passed by 
                                                 
17 Ejaz Haider. 'Where is the Centre?'. http://tribune.com.pk/story/121297/where-is-the-centre/ 
18 Interviews with Imran Khan 
19 PTI Ideology.  www.insaf.org.pk 
20 Interviews with Imran Khan 
21 Najam Sethi. Editorial. The Friday Times and Nadeem F. Paracha. The Froth of Khan. Dawn. 
 7
the then NWFP MMA government as 'a controversial law' which would 'weaken 
institutions in the name of Islam'.22 
       In the same way the PTI's stand on the current 'Blasphemy law' controversy mirrors 
it's particular Centrist view on Islam in Pakistani politics. The PTI terms the misuse of 
'Blasphemy law' (Section 295-C of Pakistan Penal Code) to unfairly target minorities, as 
being against the spirit of Islam and Constitution of Pakistan.  The liberal groups seek 
the removal of the law while the conservative religious groups refuse to consider any 
amendment to the Law. The PTI did not join the Tahafuz-e -Namoos-e-Resalat forum and 
yet did not condemn it like other liberal groups. The PTI has refrained from making 
judgments about 'whether it is a good law or a bad one' and contends that it does not 
have a problem with the Blasphemy Law itself but with it's implementation. According 
to the PTI 'the teachings of Islam are very clear on standards of justice being equal for 
Muslims and non-Muslims' and therefore it actively seeks to amend the Law and 
introduce safeguards against it's misuse, which it believes are exacerbating religious 
intolerance in the country.23  
      Given this the PTI is simultaneously labelled as a 'right of Center' party and a 'left of 
Center party with semi-jihadist tendencies', dependening of the affiliation of those 
identifying it. The PTI agenda has been described as being 'riddled with contradictions' 
and characterized by 'muddle-headed spirituality’. The PTI Chairman is often described 
as a 'terrorist without a beard' and his admirers called 'jeaned jihadis', essentially 
suggesting that he appeals to the sensibilities of 'religiously inclined youth with a 
modern twist'.24 Critics believe that PTI has 'recycled the prevailing discourse populist 
appeal', by engaging in 'empty sloganeering against America to gain relatively cheap 
political support'. Various critics in Pakistan consider the PTI to be propagating 'half-
baked ideas' to the public and being 'caught in a no man's land, satisfying neither 
liberals nor conservatives'.25 Because of 'self-inflicted follies' and it's 'unwillingness to 
                                                 
22 Interviews with Imran Khan 
23 Interview with AM Shahid Zulfiqar. 
24 Nadeem F. Paracha. The Froth of Khan. Dawn  and Raza Habib. The Problem with Imran Khan's politics. ET. 
25 Najam Sethi. Editorial .The Friday Times. 
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balance idealism and pragmatism' the PTI's political future is considered to 'ultimately 
remain bleak'.26  
The Dilemma of Representation and PTI's 'Islamic Political Orientation': 
 
      The dilemma of identifying the PTI's 'confused' place in the socio-political spectrum 
can be understood in the context of typologies of 'contemprory Islamic political 
orientations' which make a distinction between 'traditionalism', 'secularism' and 
'modernism'. Islamic 'traditionalism' can be seen as an orientation that wants to revive the 
'original or pristine' view of Islam and wants to rebuild or conserve what it considers to 
be the 'authentic' Islamic tradition. Islamic 'secularism' is another orientation that 'wants 
to caste aside or at least benignly ignore Islam's political teachings'. Muslim 'secularists' 
aim to preserve and expand already existing secular institutions, frequently employing 
Western ideologies as a counterweight to Islamic tradition. The Muslim 'modernists' 
however seek to accomplish their goal of reforming the Muslim society by taking a 
middle of the path approach of 'reforming the existing system' through 'intellectual 
discourse, modern education and legal reform that is based in Islam'.27 
 
      In Pakistan's current context then the 'traditional' orientation correlates manifestly 
with the right wing groups, as does the position of the secularist Islam with the so called 
'liberals'. Given these characterizations it is easy to also define the predominant nature of 
the Pakistan government or in other words the 'ruling establishment' as being a 'Muslim 
secularist entity' which 'does not seek a true separation of state and religion' but often 
'uses state resources and institutions to weaken religious institutions and maintain the 
dominance of the state institutions over religion'.28 Such governments achieve 
domination 'either through the co-option of the religious establishment or radically 
restrictive laws', and in Pakistan's case it has clearly been the former strategy.   
 
                                                 
26 Khaled Ahmed. Desperately Seeking Liberal Fascist ,Saleem H Ali. The Imran Khan Factor. Express Tribune.  
27 Nasim A. Jawed. Islam's Political Culture. University of Texas Press. 1998. 129-168. 
28 Ibid.  
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       While the traditional and secular categories overshadow the current religious 
orientations in Pakistan's public discourse, it is interesting to note that the PTI's religious 
orientation falls into the third category that of 'Islamic modernism'. Islamic modernism 
is characterized by it's advocacy of a 'liberal outlook in the interpretation of Islam's 
message'. In this sense this orientation has also been described as 'Islamic liberalism' 
which  pursues 'liberal values to seek general Islamic goals of justice and equality' It 
emphasizes the importance of 'social justice, supports the ideas associated with Islamic 
socialism and recognizes the importance of liberal democratic institutions'.29 The PTI 
ideology clearly reflects this 'Muslim modernist' approach which believes that that 
'liberal democratic institutions can provide the ideal conditions to meet Islamic goals'.30 
 
         Currently eclipsed by the two dominant orientations, Muslim modernism plays a 
significant role in the background of  polarized circumstances as the 'prime synthesizer 
of the old and new' and 'Islamic liberalism' that drives it represents the desire and efforts 
of many Muslims to achieve a rapprochement between Islam and modernity that is 
'spiritually satisfying as well as politically workable'.31 This orientation is significant in 
the PTI context because it's mirrors the PTI agenda in Pakistan to bridge the polarized 
divide. Clearly however the 'Islamic liberalism' does not coincide with the orientation 
that is called 'liberal' in Pakistan and this causes a conflict between the views of the 
'liberal' elements and the PTI. 
Liberalism in Pakistan: 
        In this context it is instructive to study what liberalism actually stands for in 
Pakistan. In many ways the term liberal seems to be a 'misnomer' in Pakistan where 
'liberalism' is not really a reflection of a 'political philosophy', but of 'personal choices of 
morality'. As a liberal, one is 'seen as standing for personal hedonism', not more complex 
freedoms and principles of law and equity.32 More often than not the 'liberals' in 
                                                 
29 Nasim A. Jawed. Islam's Political Culture. University of Texas Press. 1998 . 129-168 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid. 
32 Riffat Hassan. Dawn 2002., and Basil Nabi Malik. 'Will the Moderates Ever Stand Up?', ET 
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Pakistan, who demand 'liberal secular institutions', are perceived as 'secularists',33 a 
characterization that is generally not readily acceptable to the general public. In the 
public perception then 'liberalism' has somewhat become synonymous with 'libertinism'  
and 'Western values' that the so called 'liberals' openly espouse.34 In fact this has been 
pointed out that one reason why so many people in Pakistan today try to avoid the label 
of 'moderate' or 'liberal' is the perception of having  been 'sold out on their religion to the 
West and it's suffocating terminology'.35 The PTI itself describes this ruling elite as  
'inept, corrupt selfish politicians, feudals, civil and military bureaucrats and other vested 
interests who have plundered Pakistan and have brought it to the brink of disaster'. 36 
 
        The Pakistani 'liberals' espouse the Leftist liberal values of 'free speech' and 'rule of 
law', but  do not seem to want  to instill the economic and democratic mechanisms to 
ensure them or practice the egalitarian values such as the distribution of power and 
wealth which underline liberalism in the literal sense.37 Liberalism is also considered to 
be 'elitism' which has come to be associated with the 'landed elite' or the 'ruling elite' 
who enjoy unprecedented levels of wealth and education, but have 'never considered it 
their responsibility as the best educated and most privileged in society to contribute to 
its development'.38 In this sense the term 'liberal' is also predominantly associated with 
the entity that is called the 'Establishment' in Pakistan.39  
 
       Many 'liberal' commentators in the West describe the liberals in Pakistan as the 'US-
backed politico-military elite who are at loggerheads with the common citizens of the 
country' and characterize the current polarization within the country as a 'divide 
between the majority of the people of Pakistan and their corrupt, uncaring rulers'. These 
Westernized elite unabashedly support and further Western imperial agenda in 
Pakistan, so much so that analysts have described them as 'Native Orientalists' who seek 
to serve their imperial masters and consequently ensure their self-preservation at the 
                                                 
33 Najam Sethi. Editorials. The Friday Times.  http://najamsethi.com/ns/the-friday-times-editorialsarticles/ 
34 Omer Z Meer. Reality Check, The Left is the New Right. Express Tribune. 
35 Tariq Ramadan. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. Feb, 2010. 
36 PTI Constitution. 
37 Interviews with Imran Khan. also Basil Nabi Malik. 'Will the Moderates Ever Stand Up?', ET.  
38 Interviews with Imran Khan. also  Mohammad Waseem. Politics and the State in Pakistan. 1998 
39 Mohammad Waseem. Politics and the State in Pakistan. 1998 
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top.40 These liberals have 'routinely excoriated the patriots who have opposed Pakistan’s 
surrender to US-Zionist demands, as naïve sentimentalists unaware of the tough 
demands of realpolitik' and believe that Pakistan 'can save itself only through eager 
prostration before the demands of foreign powers'.41 The PTI also endorses the view of 
those liberals who claim that the right wing faction's 'deep hostility to the US and this 
elite has less to do with religion, but more to do with the knowledge that the US has 
backed this elite since time immemorial and vice versa'.42  
 
       Given the post-9/11 scenario and the ensuing 'enlightened moderation' discourse, 
the 'liberals' also describe themselves as 'moderates', reflecting 'western labels' of 
'alternatives to fundamentalism'.43 While in literal terms liberalism does symbolize 
moderation, in Pakistan however 'moderation' seems to have become another form of 
extremism with the liberals vehemently pursing a 'radical' agenda.44 Historically, the 
liberal faction in Pakistan has also shown itself to be 'inflexible and uncompromising' in 
it's political stance and thereby contributing further to more polarization in the society 
with their polices. In comparison the 'religious right' has made more compromises and 
has been 'more sensitive to the changes in the structure of Pakistani society' than the 
ruling elite, a fact that does not reflect positively on the liberals.45 
 
       In a sense then the PTI seeks to 'redefine liberalism in Pakistan'. Infact the PTI 
considers this to be an important step in addressing the problem of polarization in the 
country. By initiating a debate on the nature of liberalism it intends to present a 
'meaningful, progressive alternative form of liberalism to people, based on actual liberal 
ideas and which does not require adherence to the secular or traditional dichotomies'.46 
 
PTI's differences with  'Liberals': 
                                                 
40 M. Shahid Alam. 'The Native Orientalists at the Daily Times....' CounterPunch. Dec 2009. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Tariq Ali. The Duel. Scribner.2008 also Eqbal Ahmed in Z. M et al  'Making Enemies, Creating Conflict' 
43Tariq Ali. The Duel. Scribner. 2008 and Basil Nabi Malik. 'Will the Moderates Ever Stand Up?', ET 
44 Riffat Hassan. Dawn.2002. also  Najam Sethi. Editorials. The Friday Times. 
45 Vali Nasr. The Vanguard of the Islamic revolution :the Jamaʻat-i Islami of Pakistan. University of California Press 
46 Interview with Imran Khan. 
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     The PTI compares the so-called liberals to fundamentalists 'who try to tell you how to 
live your life' and who are 'afraid of Islam'. It The PTI points out that on the one hand, 
these liberals 'object to conservative fatwas by local clergy' but on the other, they 
'welcome diktats from foreign sources that fit into their liberal agendas'. The PTI 
describes this as 'a political and ideological surrender to Western interests' and also 'as 
an admission of defeat' showing that the liberal’s own framework is 'non-representative 
and illegitimate'.47 
Opposition to the US War on Terror and Use of Military Force: 
     One of the greatest issues that the PTI disagrees with the liberal ruling establishment 
in it's support of the US led 'war on terror'. The PTI categorically stands against it, 
largely because it believes that this war's 'objectives cannot be achieved militarily and 
instead results in the loss of innocent lives'. The PTI emphasizes that is 'not anti-US' but 
is against the US intervention in Pakistan's national politics and violation of it's national 
sanctity in the form of drone attacks etc. The PTI considers the US intervention to be the 
primary reason for rising extremism in Pakistan because it has come to be seen  as a war 
against Islam.48 The PTI  believes that these so-called liberals are actually encouraging 
extremism in this country by supporting the US intervention and are keeping quiet 
about the injustices meted out by the US drone strikes in the tribal areas. 49 It is also 
derided by the liberals because it does not support  military operations by the Pakistan 
Army in the tribal areas and elsewhere, and seeks to 'engage in a meaningful dialogue' 
with the Taliban to put an end to the threat of terrorism.  
Women's rights and the Protection of Women’s Rights Bill Controversy : 
    Another reason the PTI has irked the liberals is because it did not support the 
Protection of Women’s Rights Bill in 2006 and was condemned for having a radical 
agenda and for collaborating with the right wing groups to thwart women's rights. The 
PTI termed the Bill be 'just an eyewash by General Musharraf to please the West' and 
asserted that it was aimed at dividing the opposition parties of the time.  The PTI also 
                                                 
47 Interviews with Imran Khan. 
48 Interviews with Imran Khan . also Interviews with AM Shahid Zulfiqar 
49 Ibid. 
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contended that this Bill was hardly a debate on women's rights and that the epicenter of 
the discussion was 'not what would be in the best interest of Pakistani women, but 
whether the Hudood Ordinance and it's modification was Islamically-sanctioned or 
not'.50  
      To add to this controversy the liberal groups also blame PTI for being pro-Taliban for 
not openly condemning the very controversial video of a Swat girl being flogged by the 
Taliban. Although the PTI spoke out against the incident, it claims that it 'reserved it's 
judgment on the authenticity of the video before condemning it publicly'. Apart from 
this controversy, the President of the PTI Women's Wing points out that 'PTI is the only 
political party that comes out to demonstrate for women's rights along with the civil 
society' and has taken a forceful stand on every women's right issue in the last fifteen 
years.51  
The PTI's differences with the right-wing Islamist groups: 
 
     The PTI envisions Pakistan as an 'egalitarian modern Islamic welfare state' which is 
'progressive, democratic and people oriented' in nature.52 This vision of Islam in 
Pakistan politics is a significant departure from the rigid, puritanical views of the right-
wing Islamist groups. However more often then not the PTI has been characterized as a 
'pro-Taliban', 'semi-jihadist' organization with 'overly right-wing tendencies'. The liberal 
groups also ostracize the PTI for its 'open collaboration with right-wing groups and 
supporting their agenda with it's anti-Western rhetoric'. The PTI  alliance with groups 
like the Jamaat Islami in the All Parties Democratic Movement, which the PTI described 
as 'a political alliance with a political objective to remove President Musharraf', have 
been seen as indication of it's own radical agenda.53 
 
      PTI's concerns overlap with the right-wing groups over political issues such as 
American interference in Pakistan politics etc, it points out, but it's interests also diverge 
                                                 
50 Interviews with Imran Khan . also Interviews with AM Shahid Zulfiqar 
51 Ibid. 
52 PTI Constitution. 
53 Najam Sethi. Editorials. Friday Times. also Raza Habib. The Problem with Imran Khan's politics. ET 
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significantly from the religious right on central issues like sectarian violence, terrorism, 
women's rights, etc. The PTI does not support the 'literalist interpretations' of Islam 
upheld by these groups nor does it agree with 'the imposition of Shariah laws at 
gunpoint'.54 The PTI also vehemently resists the 'theo-ideological framework of 
Islamization employed by the religious parties in collaboration with their bureaucratic 
and military patrons for political purposes'. It believes that by patronizing the religious 
right groups and sanctioning the 'sacralization of politics' the ruling establishment has 
produced a political climate where efforts at Islamization have 'only served as a 
framework for dividing the country and pitting its diverse people against each other'. 
According to the PTI ideology when religion is pushed explicitly  into politics it becomes 
'a currency of power', when anyone can use religion to garner support and undercut 
rivals.55 
 
      The PTI does not also agree with the religious right wings 'narrow outlook' on 
Pakistani politics solely as a struggle between Islam and 'Western imposed secularized 
democracy'. It considers the Islam vs. West narrative to be 'unrealistic'. The PTI also 
believes that by moving the public conversation away from 'one rooted in individual 
right of Muslims to one that is based on allegations of Western conspiracies against 
Islam', the religious right  has also contributed to 'a wider Pakistani political culture of 
victimhood that habitually shirks responsibility for dealing honestly and effectively with 
the country’s own problems'. The PTI also recognizes that these radical groups remain 
marginalized in the political system largely because they do not have popular support 
with the public which 'refuses to be indoctrinated' by their propaganda blitzkrieg. 56 
 
       On its part the PTI  maintains a 'pragmatist' religious policy which acknowledges 
that religion will always be a part of Pakistan politics. It notes that the fact that 'every 
government in power has appropriated Islamic symbols in politics' attests the 
incomparable influence of Islam on the life and thought of Pakistanis, as even 
'secularism' has been presented with a veneer of Islamization'. But it also believes that 
                                                 




the conviction of upholding Islamic principles should not be equated to the imposition 
of a puritan Islamic state as envisioned by the Islamist forces. 57 
 
Extremism and Intolerance: 
     One of the central concerns about the right-wing radicals that the PTI takes issue with 
is the ideology of extremism which perpetrates intolerance in the society. The PTI 
categorically condemns the elements in the right-wing who 'preach hatred and 
divisiveness while indulging in brutal savagery to further their aims' and also consider 
the increasingly shrill proclamations of religiosity from these groups to be extremely 
hypocritical 'when people of all religions are being killed mercilessly' in the country. The 
PTI does not support or relate to the 'obscurantist Islamic jingoism' purported by the 
groups who believe that 'murderers should be celebrated, that minorities must live in 
perpetual fear and that personal freedoms accounts to nothing'. 58 
 
      The PTI ideology specifically addresses the root causes of religious extremism, which 
it believes are 'injustice, poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy' because it believes that 
'those who lack political capital, such as large land holdings, modern education, 
industry, family connections, are more likely to use religion and use it virulently'. For 
the PTI the real cause of extremism is the ' growing income gap between the rich and the 
poor, the failure of the current leadership to address the economic concerns of the 
people and visible corruption by the ruling elite' which frustrates the people. Because it 
believes that the only long term solution to extremism is education, it aims to bring 
about 'an education revolution' by focusing on primary education and literacy, 
introducing a uniform curriculum, teacher training and gradually increasing the budget 
outlays on education from the current 1.5% to 5.0% of GDP within 5 years.59 
Women's rights:  
     The PTI's stance on women's rights is another great departure from the 
fundamentalist right-wing ideology. The PTI believes that the fundamentalists and the 
religious right advocates a tremendously 'obscurantist' and 'restrictive' view of women's 
                                                 
57 Interviews with Imran Khan, also Interviews with AM Shahid Zulfiqar 
58 Interviews with Imran Khan 
59 Ibid. 
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rights rejects the 'self-appointed role' of these group in defining the rights of women. It 
challenges and questions the validity of  interpretations and measures that these groups 
apply to curtail women's rights in the name of Islam.60  
 
    The PTI also disagrees with the right-wing viewpoint which considers the struggle for 
women’s rights as 'a western conspiracy' and which seeks to explain the problems facing 
women in Pakistan as 'a result of the creeping penetration of Western influence', and 
'routinely downplays the abuses against women'.61 The PTI also terms the right-wing 
groups' relationship to women as being contradictory, as it has been based more on 
responding opportunistically to various political developments than on strict adherence 
to its Islamist doctrine. It claims that 'these groups recognize the political utility of 
bringing women into the political sphere and whenever it suits their purposes, of 
finding a place for them within their religious ideology and political activities'.62 
 
     Reflecting its stance on the other issues, the PTI's stands in the center of the debate on 
women's rights which reflects the divergent worldviews between the religious political 
parties, on the one hand, and the liberal groups on the other, where any opinion 
opposed to such fundamentalist views invites an immediate and vitriolic response from 
the religious right, who accuse others of being 'westernized, alienated, and un-Islamic'. 
Inversely in the liberal viewpoint any mention of Islamic values is automatically 
considered to be 'regressive, backward and fundamentalist, pro-Taliban'. 63 
 
PTI agenda and 'Ideological resonance' with Public Aspirations:  
 
     Given the above analysis it seems clear that the PTI is standing at a crossroads where 
it is seeking to define it's place in the polarized political spectrum and find a 
representative space for its viewpoint. The PTI describes itself as a broad based social 
movement, so it is instructive to study it's situation as such. This can be understood to 
some extent in terms of 'frame resonance' in social movement theory where a 'frame' 
                                                 
60 Interview with Fauzia Kasuri. 
61 Ibid 
62 Interviews with Imran Khan 
63 Interviews with Imran Khan. also Interviews with AM Shahid Zulfiqar.  
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represents an 'interpretative schemata' which provides a framework for 'making sense' 
of events and experiences by interpreting 'causation, evaluating situations, and offering 
proscriptive remedies'. 64 
 
      The 'novelty' of the frame lies not so much in the 'originality or newness of it's 
ideational elements', but in the manner in which they are 'plied together and articulated', 
such that 'a new angle of vision, vantage point or interpretation is provided'.65 In this 
sense then the PTI seems to be offering a new 'frame' for identification in Pakistan with 
it's own interpretation of the current scenario, which departs significantly from the 
already 'existing frames'. In terms of religious orientation the PTI ideology reflects a 
'modernist' outlook that has an inclination for 'Islamic liberalism', a standpoint that is 
not reflected elsewhere in the political spectrum in Pakistan. It's Centrist political 
ideology distinguishes it from other mainstream parties with it's 'ability to withstand 
pressures from the right-wing groups as well as the liberals and remain consistently 
committed to its principles'.66 
 
     According to the 'frame theory' social mobilization is only possible when there is 
'frame alignment' between individuals and movements 'interpretive orientations', where 
the greater the 'frame resonance' the greater is the effectiveness of a movement. That is 
the movement’s schemata must resonate with an individual’s own interpretive 
framework to facilitate participation. Furthermore this 'alignment' is contingent not only 
upon 'conformity with religious and cultural narratives, symbols, and identities' but the 
reputation of the frame 'articulator' and the 'consistency of the frame'. Social movement 
research thus indicates that 'the greater the credibility of the frame articulator, the 
greater his or her success at persuading others'.67   
       Judging by this criterion then in the PTI's case the 'frame articulator' would be the 
PTI Chairman Imran Khan whose 'credibility' has been considered 'beyond doubt and 
beyond question' even by those who consider his political stance to be 'questionable'. 
                                                 
64 Benford and Snow. Framing Process and Social Movements. Annual Review of Sociology 2000: 619-622 
65 Ibid. 
66 Adil Najam. 'Imran, Me and Democracy'. ATP  also  News Night with Talat Hussain.   
67 Benford and Snow. Framing Process and Social Movements. Annual Review of Sociology 2000: 619-622 
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Indeed, his philanthropic activities have earned him respect from even his detractors 
who find it 'impossible to cast aspersions about his integrity and financial honesty'. 68 
Critics who have described him as being 'a little self-righteous' and 'somewhat 
politically naive' have also described him as being 'fiercely independent of external 
pressures', 'consistently principled' and 'completely committed'. Some scholars have 
even claimed that, 'Much more than whatever he adds to Pakistan politics is what he 
adds to Pakistan’s self perception - a belief that we can help ourselves and if we were 
only to commit ourselves to the right causes, we can rise to great heights'.69  
        If in sociological terms movements are deemed 'successful' when their projected 
'frames' align with the 'frames' of the participants, then it appears that the PTI concerns 
coincide significantly with the public interests. However, if success is equated with 
electoral achievement then as a political entity PTI has obviously not been 'successful'. In 
this sense it can be maintained that the PTI's lack of success in electoral representation is 
not based on a lack of resonance with the public aspirations as can be seen from the 
survey of public opinion below.  
An Overview of Public Opinion: 
 
     If surveys of public opinion are a reliable criterion of reflecting general inclinations, 
then an overview of the public opinion in terms of resonance with the PTI agenda 
reveals a significant 'alignment' with the 'frame' presented by the PTI.  
 
    A study of public opinion in Pakistan reveals that a majority of Pakistanis do not 
espouse secularist tendencies and see Islam as 'encompassing the personal as well as the 
civic'. According to a survey two thirds (74%) of all Pakistanis want an 'Islamic polity' or  
in other words they want Islam to play a role in the functions of the state and  believe 
that Islam and democracy are very compatible.70  When asked about Islam's desired role 
in the civic order, 63% described it as a complete way of life. Another survey shows that 
                                                 
68 Najam Sethi. Editorials. Friday Times , Nadeem F. Paracha. The Froth of Khan. Dawn , and 
http://www.imrankhanfoundation.org/2010/12/07/imran-raises-1million-for-floods-relief-in-four-days 
69Adil Najam. Imran Khan, Me and Democracy and Get Well, Imran. ATP. & Raza Habib. The Problem with 
Imran Khan's politics. 
70 http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/3-6-09.pdf 
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almost two third of all Pakistanis (64%) use religion as a reference point in their 
everyday life.71 A majority of the Pakistanis (46%) also look up towards religion as the 
'most important thing in their lives' in another survey, ranking ‘practicing religion’ as 
number one on a ten point scale.72 Further examination of  the Pakistani public opinion 
shows that it also decisively condemns extremism. Various analysts consider Pakistan to 
be currently represented by a mostly young, sophisticated, and upwardly mobile 
population that 'aspires to the ideals of democracy and rule of law' and overwhelmingly 
reject extremism.73 Reflecting this a majority (72%) Pakistanis disagree with the  
fundamentalist right-wing ideology  and consider extremist groups like the Taliban/Al-
Qaeda to be a negative influence on the region, while only 4% support it.74   
 
       In terms of recent concerns on the PTI agenda like opposition to US drone attacks in 
Pakistan, the war on terror in general and taking the initiative to conduct dialogue with 
the Taliban, general public inclinations reveals further resonance. According to a recent 
survey, 68% Pakistanis oppose drone attacks by the United States against Taliban and al-
Qaeda targets in Pakistan.  Infact 59% Pakistanis consider US to be the biggest threat to 
Pakistan, followed by 18% who consider India, 11% Taliban a threat.75  Nearly half of 
Pakistanis (58%) did not believe the U.S. missile strikes are effective. Nearly a third of 
Pakistanis (33%) said cooperation on the war on terrorism has mostly benefited the 
United States.76   In another poll, nearly two out of three (83%) people said they opposed 
any collaboration with the U.S.-led coalition on the 'war on terror'. With regards to 
initiating a dialogue with the Taliban, significantly (56%) people favored a dialogue and 
some form of a 'peace agreement'.77  
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77 http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/24-5-08.pdf , also Anatol Lieven. Pakistan a Hard Country. 2011 
 20
     Aside from these surveys, even general public discourse seems to points towards a 
general perception that a dialogue with the Taliban and other such extremist groups 
would be 'a meaningful way of resolving the current crisis of extremism'.78 Further more 
in line with the PTI standpoint on economic independence, the public opinion shows 
that a majority of Pakistanis oppose the current Establishment's policy of using foreign 
aid for sustenance. A recent poll conducted by Gallup Pakistan shows that almost three 
fourth of all Pakistanis (74%) believe that Pakistan can survive without taking loan from 
IMF as opposed to 25%, who say taking loan is essential for Pakistan's survival.79 Also 
PTI's stance as the only political party to protests against the rising inflation in the 
country seem to be in sync with the 68% of general public's perception who believe this 
issue  effects their  lives tremendously.80  
     These statistics reflect on the fact that many policies being followed and initiated by 
the current mainstream political leadership do not reflect the aspirations of the people.81 
Consequently the public does not place much trust in its leaders and the level of 
disconnect between the political leaders and the people can also be assessed through a 
survey of public opinion. When asked about political leaders, 62% of the respondents in 
a poll described them as dishonest, 51% thought that they wielded too much power and 
responsibility, 49% believed that they were unethical. 45% of the people rated them as 
incompetent and 46% were of the view that they tend to respond to pressure from 
people more powerful than themselves. 82  
      
     These statistics also go on to show that the mainstream public opinion stands at the 
Center of the polarized debate in Pakistan. To judge by using the criterion of 'political 
orientation in Islam', the aspirations of a large majority of Pakistanis fall within the 
category of 'modernist' tendencies like the PTI, differing from the traditionalist and the 
secularist outlooks which dominate the political discourse in Pakistan,83 because the 
public in Pakistan shows an inclination towards considerable religiosity while 
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upholding progressive ideals. It is also worthy to note that these inclinations also differ 
significantly from the 'Muslim secularist' standpoint that has largely characterized the 
ruling Establishment.  
 
      An analysis of the above data shows correlation between the public and the PTI 
standpoint in terms of religious orientation, social justice, as well as Western 
interference in Pakistan, among other factors. This is not to predict, however, that such 
resonance will automatically translate into electoral success for PTI. In many ways 
however the PTI  agenda has been strangely ahead of it's time in reflecting the public 
sentiment. The PTI advocated a dialogue with Taliban instead of a military assault, but 
its advice was castigated until recently when the public as well as the international 
opinion itself began looking for a reconciliation.  The PTI was indignantly opposing US 
interference and drone attacks in Pakistan much before the recent outburst in the 
aftermath of the infamous Raymond Davis case, but only found a voice when public 
furor took up the cause. Much before the lawyers movement of 2007-2008 also, the PTI 
was urging for judicial independence but the cause never found a platform until the civil 
society took it up. 
      From the above analysis it becomes evident then that the PTI's fate remains 
intertwined with that of the public. While PTI agenda resonates with public desire, it has 
only found expression successfully whenever the public has come forward to articulate 
it's own aspirations. In many ways then the PTI can be seen as a microcosm of the larger 
society in terms of it's position and place in this polarized religious debate. It faces the 
same dilemmas and constraints felt by the society and is aided by the same factors that 
assist the society.   
Dilemmas and Constraints faced by PTI : 
      The constraints that the PTI faces are mirrored by those of the Pakistani people. 
Certain factors have not allowed an 'accepting, progressive, truly moderate version of 
Islam to flourish in Pakistan' and these are the same factors that the PTI confronts in it's 
bid for public representation. In this sense 'historical precedent' in Pakistan stands in the 
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way of articulation of public interest since such a vision of Islam has never been allowed 
to be expressed manifestly, even though it resonates with the public aspirations.84  
     In effect the facade of 'High Islam' upheld by the secular elite has always dominated 
the 'Low Islam' of the masses. The form of Islam implemented through the system of 
governance imposed by the ruling elite and driven by political motives, has also been 
classified as 'elitist-political Islamism'.85 Such elitism has generally identified itself with 
what it considers as 'an ally of convenience' in the shape of a particular variant of 
Islamism that it thinks is malleable. In this way this elitist-political Islam fostered 
radicalization through the devices of governance frameworks which have consorted 
with rightist religious movements in the hope of sustaining themselves, but in the 
process doomed the country to violence.86 
    Consequently the Centrist outlook upheld by the public has not been able to be 
articulated through its elected representatives given the level of disconnect with the 
political leadership.87 Also the liberal 'Muslim secularist' orientation of the successive 
elected governments and the 'Muslim modernist' nature of the public aspirations creates 
a 'power struggle' in which the ruling elite always appear to have an upper hand. The 
religious aspirations of the public which look up to 'democratic institutions to provide 
the ideal conditions in meeting Islamic goals', stand in contrast to those of the liberal, 
secularist ruling Establishment. 88 
      The status quo that has been maintained by the ruling Establishment in Pakistan has 
continued to thrive because it make sure that it's policies favor those who are in power 
in such a way that they continue to stay in power.  Not only that the ruling elite has no 
qualms about dominates the electoral process by indulging in illegitimate practices such 
as poll rigging, nepotism, bribery and use of force to ensure that it retains it's position at 
the top.89 These elites have been characterized as 'predatory' and 'without conscience'. 
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The PTI describes this as ‘political terrorism’, where 'people are not forced but coerced 
into voting in a particular way, through the most violent means'.90 
    Among other factors the parliamentary system of government in Pakistan presents the 
public, and consequently the PTI, with a disadvantage because it allows influential 
individuals and the feudal class to prevail over the local vote bank and consequently 
dominate representation in the parliament since 60% of Pakistan consists of rural areas.91 
One of the biggest problem in the country is that the political leadership comes only 
from the Establishment and has never been representative of the people. In this regard 
the PTI seems to be the only political party whose leadership has not been nominated or 
supported by the ruling Establishment and which seems impervious to the pressure 
exerted by the Establishment. Hence the party's excessive conflict of interest with the 
ruling elite.92   
Conclusion:  
         The infusion of religion into the public sphere has persistently led to immense 
trouble in Pakistan. But it is becoming stifling for those who are religious at heart but 
have no 'devious schemes of staging a religious coup to practice their faith with 
freedom' to live without the realization that they will be written off as fundamentalists.93 
From the PTI perspective, this holds true specifically because as seen above it has been 
constantly ostracized for voicing the need to integrate Islam pragmatically into the 
system of governance. The position that the PTI represents has been resented and 
rejected by many in Pakistan, who seem to be somewhat threatened by its stated 
conviction of constructing a paradigm of governance within the framework of normative 
Islam.  
 
      While the people of Pakistan have a strong Muslim identity and their faith is very 
important to them, they also aspire to be a part of the 'modern' world through acquiring 
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education, awareness of contemporary values, and the means to live what the Greeks 
called 'the good life'. In other words, they want both din (religion) and dunya (the 
world).94  It is a matter of utmost gravity then that in Pakistan the discourse on Islam has 
been hijacked by 'religious extremists' on the one hand and  on the other by another 
group of ' liberal extremists' .95 Many scholars now considered it vitally important to 
broaden the discourse on Islam to include a third option which would lead to the 
creation of a new discourse or an alternative paradigm which is grounded in the ethical 
principles of Islam and relates to the beliefs as well as the aspirations of middle-of-the-
road Pakistanis. In this context in contemporary Pakistan then, these scholars believe 
that this paradigm of Islamic modernism, that reflects in the PTI standpoints, is the only 
one that is likely to be accepted or actualized, because it is based on religious principles 
respected by masses of people and is not seen as a foreign imposition. 96 
 
       The ruling elite's monopolization of power and it's inability to make compromises or 
incorporate the progressive religious inclinations of the people, have continued to 
perpetuate a polarized political sphere in Pakistan. Currently however the 'power 
structures' in Pakistan are undergoing a change and consequently the roles of the 
country's 'institutional pillars' are also shifting, and power is no longer as 'centralized' 
and monopolized as it used to be. In this context the judiciary, the media and vocal civil 
society groups have emerged as a 'new source of influence' which are immensely 
responsive to public concerns.97 Such changes in the power-distribution pattern are 
making it increasingly harder for elements within the ruling elite to                                 
propagate and protect it's own interests with utter disregard of the opinion on the 
street.98  
        
      Therefore more and more civic actors, including the PTI , are concentrating on 
advocacy through the judiciary and the media. For instance the PTI has recently taken 
up the issue of the reconstitution of the Election Commission with the Supreme Court of 
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Pakistan. An impartial judicary has presented the PTI with a neutral platform to 
highlight discrepancies in the Establishment's functions such the confirmed existence of 
millions of 'bogus votes' in the Election Commissions voters' lists, which were used to 
hold the 2008 general elections.  
       Many analysts believe that while the people's will has been thwarted from being 
represented in the polarized public sphere until recently, it has been 'thriving in the 
private and societal spheres'.99 The media along with the emerging sources of influence 
have 'empowered' these private and societal spheres for the public to be able to raise its 
voice. The media acts as a conduit for the public opinion, expressing and mediating 
citizen's concerns. Infact it is the only medium in Pakistan which brings the citizens 
concerns to the public sphere and is being seen as a new center of power which may 
facilitate 'democracy and its substance'.100 In this context the media presents the PTI and 
other such groups with a 'neutral avenue of expression'. The media  recognizes that the 
PTI's Centrist stance provides an 'alternative viewpoint' to the current polarized debate, 
by providing a 'consistent balance' between religosity and progressive ideals.101     
    The PTI also seems to have benefitted to a significant extent recently from the new 
media tools like Facebook, You Tube and Twitter. As a consistent conduit for reaching 
out to the public, the PTI members have on many occassions taken recourse to using 
these social networking applications to get their message across, as was witnessed 
during the PTI's recent rallies in Peshawer and Karachi. 102These networks also provide a 
very public platform for the PTI members to raise their concerns and engage in 
meaningful discussions about PTI policy.103 In this context it seems evident that to 
further enhace it's social outreach the PTI must critically explore such new media 
platforms as a means for social benefit and construct systemic strategies to allow it to 
propagate information through this social media space. The PTI Youth Wing or the ISF, 
who seem to have taken on the initiative to tap into the vast potential of the new media 
tools through social networking, are  likely to play a crucial role in this regard.   
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        However, the public space afforded to the PTI by the mainstream and social media 
can only go so far in facilitating it's Centrist agenda. From the above analysis it seems 
clear that in many ways the PTI's concerns are tied with those of the public and will be 
realized meaningfully only if the people are able find a voice through an invigourated 
public sphere. Given the current socio-political awakening in Pakistan, it does appear 
that Centrist parties like the PTI can meaningfully represent the public aspirations. 
 
      In this context PTI success relies on the extent to which it can help energize the public 
discourse by assisting it to 'grow stronger with social activism and vigilance'104 and 
overthrowing a system that has 'castrated them over the last six decades'.105 In the 
meantime PTI also needs to consistenly prove itself its as a viable political option in the 
current scenario by ensuring that it's agenda remains relevant to the public concerns. 
Only time will tell if the PTI will be able to purposefully articulate it's Centrist ideals. It's 
simultaneous appeal to tradition and modernity may however well prove to be a way 
for the PTI to bridge the widening political gap between the traditional and the secular, 
and help preserve the Centrist discourse in Pakistan when the policies of the ruling 
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